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Clifford and Huff: An Essay on Takings

ARTICLES

AN ESSAY ON "TAKINGS""
Matthew Clifford"
Thomas Huff"
Few areas of property law engender as much confusion and controversy as takings law.1
Federalcase law interpretingthe Fifth Amendment's prohibition
on the taking of private property for a public purpose without
just compensation is voluminous and complex.2
INTRODUCTION

Americans often express a deep commitment to the protection of private property. Such expressions are common in both
our political rhetoric and our liberal democratic theory. In our
legal practice, however, the protection of private property is an
* The authors would like to thank Professors Bari Burke, Robert Natelson,
and Carl Tobias and the editors of the Montana Law Review, particularly Larry
Rger, for many helpful suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper. Additionally, Tom
Huff would like to thank countless students and two of his colleagues, Professors
John Photiades (Economics) and Richard Smith (Business Administration), with whom
he shared the work of a stimulating seminar on the "takings" issue from the mid1970s to the early 1980s. All errors which remain are ours.
** B.A., 1988, Northern Arizona University; J.D. 1995, University of Montana
School of Law. Associate of Connell & Beers. Former Law Clerk to United States
District Court Judge Donald Molloy.
*** Professor of Philosophy and Lecturer in Law, University of Montana; BA,
1964, University of Colorado; Ph.D. 1968, Rice University.
1. Page Carroccia Dringman, Regulatory Takings: The Search for a Definitive
Standard, 55 MONT. L. REV. 245, 245 (1994).

2. John L. Horwich & Hertha L. Lund, Montana Supreme Court Unnecessarily
Misconstrues Takings Law, 55 MONT. L. REV. 455, 459 (1994).
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area of marked complexity, controversy, and confusion. The Constitution requires the government to compensate property owners if it "takes" their property.3 But adverse governmental impacts on property are ubiquitous, both because most governmental actions requiring tax revenues affect the distribution of property and because almost every direct government regulation of
property affects its value, use, or disposition.' Obviously not all
governmental actions that adversely affect property interests
constitute compensable takings.' Indeed, the government is said
to take property only when the adverse effect "goes too far.'
This merely begs the question, however. Deciding what government activity "goes too far" determines exactly what counts as a
taking,
and effectively decides how the law protects private prop7
erty.

Few important areas of American law appear as uncertain
as takings law. The failure of our legal practice to provide clear
principles in the taking area leaves the protection of private
property in a state of perennial uncertainty and confusion. Two
recent papers in the Montana Law Review acknowledge these
difficulties but do little to explain them.' We attempt to offer
such an explanation here.
Our thesis can be stated simply. Americans have been unable to agree on clear principles protecting private property,
because we disagree over the fundamental reasons private prop-

3.

See U.S. CONST. amend. V.

4.

See MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 146 (1993).
5. See id. But see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
6. See RADIN, supra note 4, at 146. The expression, "goes too far," comes from

Justice Holmes' landmark opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
415 (1922).
7. See RADIN, supra note 4, at 146.
8. See Horwich & Lund, supra note 2; Dringman, supra note 1. Horwich and
Lund never attempt to explain the difficulties in takings law. Indeed, they assert
that they will not provide a "comprehensive discussion of takings jurisprudence," and
that the scope of their comment is limited, "mak[ing] no attempt to summarize or
analyze all the federal case law on [the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on uncompensated takings of property]." Horwich & Lund, supra note 2, at 455 n.4. They find
that the volume and complexity of federal takings jurisprudence "make it risky to
provide a summary characterization of the law." Id. at 459.
Dringman does attempt to offer a broader analysis of takings law. Indeed,
much of her paper addresses the lack of clarity and certainty in state and federal
takings law, but she does not offer an explanation for these difficulties. This is because her central, stated purpose is to provide "stricter" and more "concise" takings
standards that will "protect and clarify the rights of property owners." Dringman,
supra note 1, at 246-47. Dringman's analysis of takings law and her proposals are
discussed infra in notes 50-51 and 113-14.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol59/iss1/3

2

1998]

Clifford and Huff: An Essay on Takings

AN ESSAY ON "TAKINGS"

erty ought to be protected. We ask private property to serve
several independent values. When these values conflict in particular cases, it should not be surprising that we lack any principled means of reconciling them. Moreover, our federalist decision-making structure complicates this phenomenon of independent and conflicting values by placing the primary authority for
defining property rights and, therefore, balancing the conflicting
values, in the hands of the states. The United States Supreme
Court's role under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution is, consequently, far less clear. Should the Court
assure that the states have balanced the values correctly under
principles of state law, or is the Court expected to reevaluate the
balance of values according to independent federal takings standards? The Court, itself, has been unable to decide precisely
what its responsibility should be.9 We are thus stuck in a confusion of our own making, a confusion we have been unable to
resolve through our liberal private
property values, our legal
10
structures.
legal
our
or
doctrines,
We do not pretend in this article to propose a resolution for
the difficulties in the takings area. Indeed, it is our belief that
takings law will remain governed by uncertain balancing tests
and continue to be controversial and highly fact-dependent.
Rather, we hope to show that these difficulties have their source
in the irreconcilable values that private property serves and in
the complexities of our federal structure, and to point out how
these values and structures are evident in takings doctrines and
cases. We hope, thereby, to relieve some of the confusion in takings law, though not, we expect, much of its uncertainty.
This article has five parts. Part I delineates the fundamental
tenets of private property ownership in the classical liberal tradition, and describes the relationship between the general tenets of
ownership and the particular ownership rights that persons have
in the property law of individual states like Montana. Part II
describes, explains, and summarizes the history and doctrines of
takings law. Part III analyzes the uncertain relationship between the property rights that flow from individual state law

9.
See infra text accompanying notes 176-209.
10. See RADIN, supra note 4, at 160-61. The best work explaining and evaluating the various property and anti-property arguments, in our opinion, is still LAwRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS (1977) [hereinafter
BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS]. Two useful recent works evaluating the philosophical
foundations of property rights are: STEPHEN MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY (1990)
and JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988).
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and the prohibition on the taking of property without just compensation in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Part IV explains how the general justifications for private
property rights-the source of the values private property rights
serve in our liberal tradition-lead to conflicting conceptions of
property rights in state law and to conflicting doctrinal principles in takings law and thus to deeply contested conceptions of
property in our common law and constitutional traditions. Part V
concludes by showing how the general justifications and the
issues of federalism are evident in several Supreme Court takings cases. This part attempts to demonstrate why no resolution
of the uncertainty in takings law is possible in the face of our
inability to settle both the conflict between the several values
which property is said to serve and the venue where those conflicts should be addressed."
PART I. THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONCEPTION OF PRIVATE
PROPERTY

By its own terms, the federal Takings Clause protects "private property" from government action." Before we discuss the
history or analyze the meaning of the Takings Clause, then, it
might be helpful to begin with a brief discussion of what private
property means in our legal tradition.
Suppose we found ourselves in the position of explaining to a
novice land purchaser what, in general, it means in our legal
system to own private property. We might begin, as A. M.
Honor6 does in his justly famous article on ownership, by describing ownership as "the greatest possible interest in a thing
which a mature system of law recognizes." 3 Our novice, presumably, would find this a bit vague. We might then, following
Honor6, describe the standard set of rights which constitute
ownership of a thing: the rights to possess it, to use it, to man-

11. This paper will not address federal takings cases from the United States
Court of Claims, such as those that arise under the Endangered Species Act, but will
rather focus on the far more common cases that arise from state regulation of property.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
13.

A.M. Honor6, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 108

(A.G. Guest ed., 1961) (emphasis omitted). Honor6's definition, referring as it does to
a "mature system of law," simply describes what ownership means in such a system.
Other conceptions of ownership, not of importance to our analysis, can arise in more
anarchic situations. See, e.g., Andrew Morriss, Private Actors & Structural Balance:
Militia & the Free Rider Problem in Private Provision of Law, 58 MONT. L. REV. 115,
138-44 (1997).
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age it, to receive income from it, to use it for capital and security, to transmit it to others, and to the absence of terms limiting
those rights in the thing. 4 We could call this set of rights the
"standard incidents" of property ownership (the famous bundle of
sticks from law school). We would have to add that the law limits the standard incidents in certain ways: for example, an owner
cannot use property in a manner that harms other owners and
may lose property if a judgment is executed against her. We
could summarize our description by lumping the incidents of
ownership into three broad rights: the rights to possession, use,
and disposition. 5 We could then explain what each of these
rights entails. For example, Honor6 describes the possession
right as follows:
The right to possess, viz. to have exclusive physical control of a
thing, or to have such control as the nature of the thing admits,
is the foundation on which the whole superstructure of ownership rests. It may be divided into two aspects, the right (claim)
to be put in exclusive control of a thing and the right to remain
in control, viz. the claim that others should not without permission interfere.16
Similar definitions for the rights of use and disposition could be
offered.
If our novice is at all astute, she will notice that the standard incidents do not provide a very good description of the way
we regard property in modern, everyday life. She might say
something like the following: "The standard incidents may describe your theoretical incidents of ownership, but when I look at
your actual practice, I see that these standard incidents are far
from absolute. State and local governments qualify each one,
either through exercise of their eminent domain or their police
powers. Indeed, governments may deny possession altogether if
they compensate you, and they may limit uses through their
power to prohibit nuisances, to zone in the public's interest, to
provide for economic efficiency, to protect the environment, and
to guarantee economic and social justice."
We would have to concede that all this is true. We would
still insist that the best way to understand ownership of property
is to recognize the force of the standard incidents and then to

14. See Honor6, supra note 13, at 112-24.
15. See RAIN, supra note 4, at 120.
16.
Honord, supra note 13, at 113. Note that while the rights are to things,
they entail claims against persons.
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acknowledge the qualifications that the state places on them.
These qualifications include common law rules, land use planning laws and regulations, nuisance laws and regulations, various commercial laws and regulations, taxation laws, and even
anti-discriminations laws and regulations.
We could offer some examples. A prominent one would be
the law of adverse possession. Although the standard incidents
give the owner the right to possess property, in Montana owners
can lose this right simply by failing to object within five years to
another person's continuous possession of some or all of the property.17 An owner, similarly, can lose the standard right to exclude other persons by failing to object to their habitual invasion
of the property. 8 In both cases, the adverse parties could then
claim rights associated with the standard incidents-a claim of
title and of an easement, respectively. 9 Other jurisdictions-perhaps in response to different local conditions or customs-have adopted different rules of possession and exclusion.
In New York, for instance, a property owner has ten years to
object to another's invasion of his or her land.2"
A second example of a condition on the standard incidents is
the law of nuisance. Although the standard incidents traditionally give a landowner the right to enjoy property free from unreasonable interferences-such as offensive smells-from neighboring property, Montana limits landowners' rights to object to
certain activities deemed to be of overriding public value, such as
farming operations.2" Again, other jurisdictions condition the
standard right of enjoyment in other ways. Utah, for example,
extends the above exception to certain manufacturing operations.'
A third example is laws providing public access to waterways. The standard incidents include the right to exclude others.
But in Montana, landowners have no right to exclude the public
from the portions of their property which lie below the normal
high-water mark of streams.' In Colorado, landowners do have
such a right.' In Wyoming, they may prevent the public from
17. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-19-404 (1997).
18. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-19-405 (1997).
19. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-19-404 to -405 (1997).
20. See N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTS. LAW § 501 (McKinney 1979).
21. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-30-101(3) (1997).
22. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-38-5(1) (1996).
23. See Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 211 Mont. 29,
35-36, 684 P.2d 1088, 1091 (1984); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-301 to -322 (1997).
24. See People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1030 (Colo. 1979).
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wading on the stream bottom, but not from floating over it on
the surface of the water. 25
We could then conclude our answer to our novice's first questions by saying: "Ownership of private property means what the
particular jurisdiction says it means, and owning private property is simply a matter of positive law in that jurisdiction. In
American jurisdictions, that positive law generally consists of the
standard incidents plus various common law, statutory law, and
regulatory schemes. The standard incidents provide a sort of
legal baseline against which the laws and regulations determine
the precise or actual system of private property ownership."
But, our novice might now ask, "isn't there a principle of
constitutional law-in the Takings Clause-that requires the
states to compensate landowners in some circumstances when
the states change landowners' property rights by changing the
state's positive law of property? In short, doesn't this Takings
Clause also affect property ownership in our legal tradition?"
Here we would have to answer affirmatively, noting that the
Takings Clause has a long and complicated history, a history
that our novice should understand before we attempt to explain
the Takings Clause and its exact relationship to state positive
law.
PART II. THE HISTORY AND DocTRINEs OF "TAKINGS" LAW

A. The Pre-Civil War Period
The period between the founding era and the Civil War saw
almost no protection of private property from state action in2
either the United States Supreme Court or the state courts. 6
Prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court generally lacked the authority to review state actions, including state property regulations. s7 Furthermore, because the federal government "had little need to acquire or regulate land," there were few opportunities to apply the Fifth
Amendment to federal action. 2 At the same time, state courts

25. See Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 151 (Wyo. 1961).
26. See FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAKING ISSUE 80-81 (1973). This work,
written for the Council on Environmental Quality, remains a standard history of the
taking issue. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1056
(1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
27. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833); Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. 84
(1857); see also BOSSELMAN, supra note 26, at 114-15.
28. BOSSELMAN, supra note 26, at 114-15.
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generally found compensable takings under state constitutions
only when state action either physically appropriated or directly
acquired title to land. In fact, during the pre-Civil War period,
state courts "were willing to uphold police power regulations
even when they left landowners with no feasible use of their
land."29
B. The Post-Civil War Period
Following the adoption of the Civil War amendments, during
the period often called the era of "substantive due process,""°
the Supreme Court began to apply the Takings Clause" to protect private property from state regulation. 2 However, "no clear
pattern emerged from the Court's early decisions under the taking clause.... [Indeed] when the Court was convinced the
government's purpose was sound it was willing to uphold government actions despite fairly severe damage to private proper3
ty."

3

Although the Court provided somewhat more protection after
the Civil War than state courts had provided both before and
after the Civil War, the Court's protections focused largely on
whether the government had permanently and directly encroached on the property.' Police power regulations-those reflecting the states' broad power to protect the general welfare-were, by definition, not considered takings.3 5 For example,
in Richmond, Fredricksburg & Potomac Railway Co. v. Richmond,"s the Court asserted: "The power to govern implies the
power to ordain and establish suitable police regulations ... Appropriate regulation of the use of property is not 'taking' proper-

29. Id. at 106.
30.
The "substantive due process" era refers roughly to 1890-1930.
31.
The Takings Clause was applied through the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process clause. In some cases, the Court protected property with the due process
clause alone. See infra note 57.
32.
In particular, the Supreme Court protected property owners against government regulation of commerce. See, e.g., Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. v. Chicago,
166 U.S. 226 (1896). The Supreme Court also began to offer some, though not uniform, protection for private landholders against government physical invasions. See,
e.g., Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871) (protecting against physical invasions from dam water).
33. BOSSELMAN, supra note 26, at 117; see also Hadacheck v. Sabastian, 239
U.S. 394 (1915).
34. See Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878).
35. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 667-68 (1887).
36. 96 U.S. 521 (1877).
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ty within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition."37
Meanwhile the state courts continued to find takings only when
there had been an "actual appropriation of the property by the
taker for the latter's own use."'
An interesting sideline in takings doctrine, particularly pertinent to Montana, developed as a reaction to the general rule
that a taking could not occur without direct physical occupation.
During the thirty year period following the Civil War, considerable public hostility arose over the effects on private property of
the construction of public works. Public improvements, such as
changes in road grades and construction of elevated railroads
often affected landowners' access easements or easements of
light and air.39 Under the direct appropriation rule, landowners
could not recover for such injuries when the offending project
was located adjacent to their property rather than directly on
it.' This concern led to the passage of amendments to many
state constitutions, beginning in 1870 in Illinois, providing that
"private property could neither be taken, nor damaged for public
use without just compensation."4 1 These "or damaged" clauses
specifically targeted the effects of public works on private property. Examples included road grade changes that reduced or eliminated accessibility, the building of elevated railroads which
blocked light and air, and direct physical injuries like wells drying up due to deep excavation in nearby public works or surface
water flooding of land adjacent to public works.4 2
Montana included the "or damaging" language in Article III,
Section 14 of its 1889 constitution. In 1903, the Montana Supreme Court applied this language in Less v. City of Butte.'
Less was exactly the sort of case that had led to the adoption of
the "or damaging" language. The owner of a home adjacent to a
street in Butte sued for damages caused by the city's change in

37. Richmond, Fredricksburg& Potomac Ry. Co., 96 U.S. at 528-29.
38. BOSSELMAN, supra note 26, at 122.
39. See 2A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.0212], at 6-33 to -34 (Julius L.
Sackman ed., 3d ed. rev. 1997) [hereinafter NICHOLS].
40. See, e.g., Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914) (finding
no taking for disturbance associated with railroad tracks adjacent to the plaintiff's
property).
41. NICHOLS, supra note 39, § 6.02[1], at 6-30, n.15.
42. See, e.g., NICHOLS, supra note 39, § 6.11, at 6-176 (changes in road grade);
id. § 6.11[2], at 6-180 (easements of light and air); id. § 6.0811], at 6-119 (wells); id.
at § 6.08[1], at 6-120 to -121 (surface water). See also Robert Kratovil and Frank J.
Harrison, Jr., Eminent Domain - Policy and Concept, 42 CAL. L. REV. 596, 664
(1954).
43. 28 Mont. 27, 72 P. 140 (1903).
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the street grade." The court carefully distinguished the "taking" from the "or damaging" clauses.45 It first noted that the
"taking" clause "contemplate[s] the physical taking of property
only,"" and then explained the "or damaging" clause:
Under constitutions which provide that property shall not be
"taken or damaged" it is universally held that "it is not necessary that there be any physical invasion of the individual's
property for public use to entitle him to compensation." The
owner of a city lot has "a kind of property in the public street
for the purpose of giving to such land facilities of light, of air,
and of access from such street." "These easements are property,
protected by the constitution from being taken or damaged
without just compensation."47
The court required the city to pay damages for the change in the
road grade affecting the homeowner's access easement.48
It is important to note that nothing in Less suggests that the
"or damaging" clause should be read to protect private property
owners from police power regulations as opposed to public works
projects. None of the ten cases cited by the court for the meaning
of the clause addresses police power regulations.49 Nor can support for such a proposition be found in the history leading to the
adoption of the clause.5"

44. See Less, 28 Mont. at 29, 72 P. at 140.
45. See id. at 31-32, 72 P. at 141.
46. Id. at 32, 72 P. at 141. The court's analysis of the Takings Clause is thus
consistent with the history of takings law up to 1903.
47. Id. (citations omitted).
48. See id. at 33-34, 72 P. at 141-42.
49. See id. at 32, 72 P. at 141.
50. In a recent comment in the Montana Law Review, Page Carroccia Dringman
appeared to reach the opposite conclusion and suggested that Montana courts should
use the "or damaging" language as justification for a stricter review of police power
regulations than federal courts apply under the federal takings clause. Dringman,
supra note 1, at 259-61, 275. We do not believe the history of the "or damaging"
language supports such a reading of the clause. Dringman bases much of her analysis on a 1981 case, Knight v. City of Billings, 197 Mont. 165, 642 P.2d 141 (1982), in
which the Montana Supreme Court held that the city had taken property through
the combined effects of a street widening project and refusal to re-zone some of the

adjacent parcels. Dringman ignores the court's warning that its holding was limited
to this peculiar set of facts. See id. at 174, 642 P.2d at 146 ("We caution that this
holding is limited to the situation here, where a physical taking across the street
occurred.") She also ignores the fact that Knight, like Less, and other "or damaging"
cases, involved public works which hampered access to and enjoyment of adjacent
parcels. See id. at 169, 174-75, 642 P.2d at 143, 146. Dringman concedes that the
Montana Supreme Court only "infrequently invokes" this particular language, "preferring [instead] to concentrate its takings analysis [in police power cases] on federal
tests," but she does not explain why. Dringman, supra note 1, at 261. We believe the
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C. The 1920s: Mahon and Regulatory Takings
Another reason why the "or damaging" language was not
construed as support for the idea that police power regulations
can "take" property is that by 1922, the Supreme Court, using
the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause, had adopted this idea on its
own.5 ' Indeed, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,52 the Court
abruptly altered its analysis of police power regulation.' At
issue in Mahon was a Pennsylvania statute known as the Kohler
Act, which prohibited the mining of coal in such a way as to
cause surface subsidence under private homes, public streets,
and public buildings." The purpose of the Act was to protect
communities in northeastern Pennsylvania from widespread
subsidence caused by the extraordinary increase in the scale of
coal mining operations in the first two decades of the twentieth
century.' The issue was whether the Kohler Act, by preventing
the company from exploiting mineral rights it purchased many
years before, took the company's property without just compensation.'
Justice Holmes, writing for the Supreme Court, forever altered takings jurisprudence. As we have seen, the Court had
previously analyzed property regulation by asking a single question: Is the regulation a valid exercise of the police power? In
other words, does it bear a rational relation to protecting the
public health, safety, or morals? Where the answer was yes, the
Court had always held that the regulation was not a taking. For
Holmes, this inquiry did not go far enough. Rather than treating
police power regulations as different in kind from traditional
takings--condemnation and physical invasion-he treated them
explanation is obvious, as we explain in section C.
51.
Indeed, this probably explains why the Montana court has only infrequently
used the "or damaging" clause. It simply did not need it. Obviously, constitutional
clauses can always be interpreted more or less broadly, and courts do not make it a
practice to limit their meaning to the specific factual context in which they arise. In
the case of the "or damaging" clause, however, the fact is the Montana Supreme
Court has not interpreted this language more broadly, and the reason for this, noted
here and in the text accompanying this note, seem compelling to us.
52. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
53. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412-13. The seminal case from the pre-Mahon period is Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), in which the Court found no taking
where a brewery became worthless after state statute made manufacture or sale of
intoxicating beverages illegal. See also Hadacheck v. Sabastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
54. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412-13.
55. See BOSSELMAN, supra note 26, at 127-29.
56. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412.
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merely as different in degree:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law. As long recognized, some
values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield
to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation must
have its limits, or the . . . due process clause ... [is] gone. One
fact for considerationin determining such limits is the extent of
diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if
not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain
and compensation to sustain the act. 7
Holmes then concluded, in Mahon's most famous phrase, that
the Kohler Act violated the Constitution: "Tle general rule at
least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, 8 if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a tak5
ing."
Mahon, then, established a two-tiered analysis for addressing whether a police power regulation is a taking, which can be
summarized as follows: 1) Is the regulation within the police
power? 2) If so, does the regulation nevertheless go too far, and
thus constitute a taking?
Having developed this analysis, the Supreme Court appears
to have promptly forgotten it, at least for a time. In the major
remaining takings cases of the 1920s, the Court focused solely on
the first prong of the analysis, as though Mahon had never existed. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 5a the Court addressed, for the first time, the general validity of zoning regulation. The Court held that a city zoning ordinance which prohibited any commercial use of the subject property did not, on its
face, violate the Fifth Amendment, because it was within the
police power: "[T]he [offered] reasons are sufficiently cogent to
preclude us from saying, as it must be said before the ordinance
can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.'
The Court

57. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413 (emphasis added); see also BOSSELMAN, supra note
26, at 139. The Mahon Court was typically inartful in distinguishing between the
due process and takings clauses during this era. This reflects the influence of the
substantive due process analysis exemplified by Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905).
58. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415. (emphasis added).
59. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
60. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395 (citations omitted). The unfortunate use of the term
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did not go on to discuss whether the ordinance, although a valid
police power regulation, went so far as to constitute a taking.
Nectow v. City of Cambridge,"' decided the following year,
provided an example of the sort of regulation that the Court
would not recognize as a valid exercise of the police power. Like
Euclid, Nectow involved the validity of a zoning classification
that prohibited commercial use. In Nectow, however, the tract in
question measured only 29,000 square feet and was surrounded
by heavy industry.62 Under these facts, the Court was unwilling
to say that the ordinance served the stated goals:
The governmental power to interfere by zoning regulations with
the general rights of the land owner by restricting the character of his use, is not unlimited, and other questions aside, such
restriction cannot be imposed if it does not bear a substantial
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."'
Here, of course, the Court can be excused for not discussing the
second prong of Mahon, because the first prong decided the case.
The same cannot, however, be said of Miller v. Schoene, 4
decided in 1928. Miller involved the validity of a Virginia statute
which mandated the destruction of the ornamental red cedar
trees on the plaintiffs' property." The purpose of the law was to
prevent the spread of cedar rust, a disease which was potentially
devastating to the state's apple-growing industry." The statute
did not provide compensation for the loss of the trees, other than
reimbursement of the cost of cutting them down, and permission
to use the resulting lumber.67 The Supreme Court found that
the loss of the trees was not a taking." It reasoned that the
power to protect the public interest "is one of the distinguishing
characteristics of every exercise of the police power which affects
property." 9 As in Euclid, the conclusion that the law was valid
under the police power ended the Court's inquiry. The Court did
"substantial" was to create confusion later on. See infra notes 109-21 and accompanying text.
61. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
62. See Nectow, 277 U.S. at 186.
63. Id. at 188 (using language set forth in Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395).
64. 276 U.S. 272 (1928). For a more detailed analysis of Miller, see discussion
infra Part V.
65. See Miller, 276 U.S. at 277.
66. See id. at 278-79.
67. See id. at 277.
68. See id. at 280.
69. Id. at 279-80.
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not go on to discuss whether the regulation, though valid, went
too far.
D. The Post-1920sEra
Following this spate of activity in the 1920s, the Supreme
Court decided almost no major takings cases until the 1970s.
Two exceptions stand out. In 1946, the Court held that the frequent overflights of a home by military aircraft constituted a
taking.7" The Court likened the overflights to a direct and permanent physical appropriation, since the attendant noise and
disturbance were so severe that "[r]espondents are frequently deprived of their sleep and the family has become nervous and
frightened."7 '
In the 1962 case of Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,72 the
Court rejected a challenge to an ordinance that effectively prevented the plaintiff from operating his gravel mining business.
In Goldblatt, the Court finally applied the long-forgotten twotiered analysis of Mahon, albeit in reverse order: the Court first
determined that there was no evidence to indicate that the ordinance lowered the value of the plaintiff's land, and thus "went
too far," and then determined that the ordinance was valid as a
safety regulation.73
E. The Modern Analysis: Penn Central
In 1978, the Court decided one of its most influential takings
cases, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.74
Penn Central involved the City of New York's decision, under an
historic preservation ordinance, to prevent the plaintiff railroad
from constructing a major addition to Grand Central Station. 5
The railroad attacked the decision under both prongs of Mahon:
It argued both 1) that the designation of the station as a landmark was arbitrary, and therefore beyond the police power,76
and 2) that the designation was such a severe restriction on the

70. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (remanding for lower
court determination of whether taking was temporary or permanent).
71. Id. at 259.
72. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
73. See Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 594-96.
74. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
75. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 104.
76. See id. at 132-35.
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use of the station that compensation was required."
In addressing these claims, the Court did not seek to announce any grand new principles of takings law. Rather, it endeavored to synthesize its prior cases into a coherent set of rules,
and particularly to flesh out the rather vague inquiry it had
announced in Mahon. It began by noting the difficulty of the
task:
[T]his Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any "set
formula" for determining when "justice and fairness" require
that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated
by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons. Indeed, we have frequently observed that whether a particular restriction will be rendered
invalid by the government's failure to pay for any losses proximately caused by it depends largely "upon the particular circumstances [in that] case. 1178
Drawing on its previous cases, the Court identified the significant factors that guide the "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries"
into whether a government action rises to the level of a taking:
The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and,
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course,
relevant considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmental action. A "taking" may more readily be found when the
interference with property can be characterized as a physical
invasion by government, than when interference arises from
some public program adjusting the -benefits and burdens of
economic life to promote the common good.79
Applying these factors to the case before it, the Court first
concluded that the landmark designation was a valid exercise of
the police power. 0 It noted that the validity of landmark laws
was well-established and rejected the argument that the landmark designation was necessarily arbitrary because it burdened
certain landowners more than others.8 Next, addressing whether the designation went too far, the Court noted the regulation
did not prevent the railroad from earning a reasonable return on
its property, or from making other, less drastic changes to the

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See
Id.
Id.
See
See

id. at 130-31.
at 124 (citations omitted).
(citations omitted).
id. at 138.
id. at 131-32.
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terminal. 2 Therefore, the Court concluded, the regulation did
not interfere with the railroad's reasonable investment-backed
expectations to the degree that it caused a taking."
F. Post-Penn Central:Building on the Framework
1. Factual Nuances
In subsequent cases, the Court has elaborated on the basic
analytical framework it articulated in Penn Central,a framework
which has come to be known as the "multi-factor balancing test."
Some of these cases have involved the application of the Penn
Central factors to different factual contexts. These cases show
that the outcome of the multi-factor analysis depends to a large
degree on factual context of the case and the nature of the property interest being asserted. For example, in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,s' the Court held that a California constitutional provision which required a shopping center to allow
political activity on its premises was not a taking. 5 The plaintiffs argued that the right to exclude others from their property
was so essential to the notion of property that its loss necessarily
implied a taking.8 In rejecting this argument, the Court focused on the fact that the property in question was commercial,
as opposed to personal, and the regulation did not appear to affect the profitability of the enterprise. 7 In sharp contrast, the
Court had found the loss of the right to exclude to be dispositive
in the context of residential property a year earlier in Kaiser
Aetna v. United States.88
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictus,9 the
Court applied the multi-factor analysis to essentially the same
set of facts it had faced in Mahon, with a different result. Keystone involved the 1966 successor to the Kohler Act, the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act." Although
the ultimate goal of the new act was the same--to prevent subsi82. See id. at 136-37.
83. See id. at 137-38.
84. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
85. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr., 447 U.S. at 88.
86. See id. at 82.
87. See id. at 83.
88. 444 U.S. 164 (1979). We believe the differing results of these cases can be
explained by examining the underlying values at stake in each case. See infra Part
IV.
89. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
90. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n., 480 U.S. at 474.
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dence damage-the Court analyzed its practical effects on mining companies quite differently. Here, the Court focused on how
much coal the Subsidence Act prevented the companies from
mining,9 1 a fact that it had ignored in Mahon. It found the burden imposed to be slight: the Act deprived the plaintiffs of the
right to mine about two percent of the extensive coal deposits
that they owned in Pennsylvania and did not prevent them from
profitably engaging in their business.92 The Court concluded
that the Act was not a taking.93
2. CategoricalRules
In some post-Penn Central cases, the Court has sought to
simplify the second prong of the takings analysis by identifying
certain classes of state action that, by definition, go too far. For
example, in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,"
the Court announced a rule that physical invasions by government are always takings, no matter how trivial they may be.95
The "invasion" in question was a half-inch television cable which,
with the City of New York's blessing, had been strung across the
roof of the plaintiffs apartment building.' The Court held that
the plaintiff could not be required to suffer this indignity without
compensation, however minimal that compensation might turn
out to be.97
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council" established another categorical rule: regulations which deny all economic use of
property are takings. The plaintiff in Lucas had bought two
beachfront lots with the intention of developing them as
homesites. 9 This intention was frustrated by the Beachfront
Management Act, an erosion-control measure which prohibited
construction close to the beach.1" Lucas argued, and the Court
agreed, that the Act "took" his property by rendering it economically worthless. The categorical rule announced by the Court
might seem unremarkable--after all, regulations that go so far

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See
See
See
458
See
See
See
505
See
See

id., at 496-97.
id. at 496-502.
id. at 501-02.
U.S. 419 (1982).
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426-35.
id. at 422.
id. at 435-38.
U.S. 1003 (1992).
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006-07.
id. at 1007.
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as to deny all economic use are by definition extreme, and undoubtedly rare. They would seem to present an easy case under
the second tier of the taking inquiry. But the Court found it
necessary to concede that in some instances states can legitimately deny all economic use without paying compensation,
because the contemplated use constitutes a public nuisance.' 1
This concession led to an intriguing and (we think) highly revealing discussion of the role of federalism in the takings inquiry.1 °2 The ultimate holding of Lucas was that regulations which
deny all economic use are per se takings, unless the prohibition
of all use was already implicit in an "objectively reasonable application" of the state's common law of nuisance." 3
3. Revisions to the First Tier: Nollan and Dolan
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,1" the Court
revised the first tier of the takings analysis, which addresses
whether the regulation is within the police power. It should be
noted, at the outset, that Nollan was a so-called "exaction" case;
that is, Nollan did not involve a general police power regulation,
05
but rather the issuance of an individual land-use permit."
Nollan thus raises the question of what police power restrictions
the government could "exact" from an owner in exchange for
issuing a permit."°
In Nollan, the court struck down a requirement that the
owner of an oceanfront property grant a public easement along
the shore as a condition for the granting of a building permit.' 7 It had previously seemed well-settled that the first tier

101.
See id. at 1030-32.
102.
See id. at 1028-32. We analyze the relationship between state law and the
federal constitution in property regulation, as discussed in Lucas, more fully in infra
Parts III and V.
103.
Id. at 1032 n.18; see also id. at 1031.
104. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
105.
See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828-29.
106.
We question the accuracy of the term "exaction" in describing these cases
because, as should be evident from the discussion in the text, the word has pejorative connotations whose appropriateness depends entirely on the outcome of a particular case. Exaction implies that a landowner has been forced to give up something to
which she had a pre-existing right. But if the conditions sought by the state do no
more than offset the public harms that would result from the contemplated use, then
it is impossible to say anything has been "exacted" from the landowner. To say otherwise would necessarily imply that the landowner has a pre-existing right to use
her land in ways that cause public harm, a proposition without legal support. Thus,
the use of the term "exaction" begs the question and is therefore unhelpful.
107.
See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841-42.
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consisted of the highly deferential "rational basis" test the Court
uses in equal protection and due process cases. Justice Brennan
made this point in his dissent: "It is... by now commonplace
that this Court's review of the rationality of a State's exercise of
its police power demands only that the State 'could rationally
have decided' that the measure adopted might achieve the
State's objective.""° This understanding had its roots in the
pre-Mahon police power cases, originating in Mugler v. Kansas."° Justice Scalia, however, writing for the majority, seized
on the fact that the cases had sometimes used the word "substantial" in describing the first-prong analysis. After Nollan,
Scalia declared for the majority, the first prong of the taking
analysis would require not a mere "rational" relation to a legitimate state interest, but instead a "substantial" relation. n Justice Scalia also made clear that this standard would not be the
same as, or even related to, the standards used in equal protection analysis.' Indeed, it was unclear just what the new standard would require:
Our cases have not elaborated on the standards for determining
what constitutes a "legitimate state interest" or what type of
connection between the regulation and the state interest satisfies the requirement that the former "substantially advance the
latter." They have made clear, however, that a broad range of
governmental purposes and regulations satisfies these requirements."'

108. Id. at 843 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (citing Minnesota
v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981)).
109.
123 U.S. 623 (1887).
110. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834. In dissent, Brennan noted that the Court may
have varied the language it used, but it did not stray from the basic character of
the rational basis test:
Our phraseology may differ slightly from case to case-e.g., regulation must
.substantially advance," Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), or be
"reasonably necessary to," Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York,
438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978), the government's end. These minor differences
cannot, however, obscure the fact that the inquiry in each case is the same.
Id. at 843-44 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
111. See id. at 834 n.3 (stating that "our opinions do not establish that [takings]
standards are the same as those applied to. due process or equal protection claims.").
112. Id. at 834-35 (citations omitted). The Court's use of the word "substantial"
to describe the required nexus can be traced from Nollan to Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), to Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183,
188 (1928), to Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926), to
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905) and ultimately to Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887), where the Court clearly meant to announce nothing
more than the traditional rational basis test.
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Unfortunately, the facts of Nollan would not help the Court shed
any light on the issue, because the Court did not appear to think
that the permit condition imposed on the plaintiff bore even a
rational relationship to the exaction of a beachfront easement.113
The Court further explained the new "substantial" analysis
1 Like Nollan, Dolan was an "exacin Dolan v. City of Tigard."
tion" case. The plaintiff was the owner of a hardware store who
wanted to expand her business."' As a condition for the necessary permits, the city asked her, among other things, to dedicate
a portion of her property lying in the floodplain of a creek for use
as a greenway and bicycle path.11 The Court's stated reason in
granting certiorari was to clarify the "required degree of connection between the exactions and the projected impact of the pro113. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838. Dringman notes, we think correctly, that Justice
Scalia's use of the term "substantial" may signal a "movement away from a 'rubber
stamp' or superficial application of the rational basis test to a more rigorous standard of review." Dringman, supra note 1, at 253. She then goes on to claim that
"the Court employed the mid-level tier of constitutional analysis [from equal protection and due process doctrine]." Id. at 254 n.56. This second claim does not appear
supportable. It not only contradicts Justice Scalia's explicit disclaimer that he was
using equal protection, middle tier analysis, but also ignores Scalia's statement that
"a broad range of governmental purposes and regulations satisfies these requirements." Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834-35.
Dringman then asserts that the Montana Supreme Court "ignored" the significance of Nollan in its recent case, McElwain v. County of Flathead, 248 Mont. 231,
811 P.2d 1267 (1991). Dringman, supra note 1, at 264. In fact, the Montana court
was quite explicit both about its own standard of review and about the significance
of Nollan. The court said:
Previous opinions by this Court have applied a standard of reasonableness to the question of whether a taking has occurred when a land-use
regulation is imposed through an exercise of police power. We have stated
that a regulation adopted through an exercise of police power must be "reasonably adapted to its purpose and must injure or impair property rights
only to the extent reasonably necessary to preserve the public welfare."
Although "reasonable" is the language this Court has applied to our
analysis of taking issues, it is nonetheless a standard of equivalent merit
and significance to the federal standard of "substantial." As the United
States Supreme Court points out in Nollan the standards to be applied to
taking challenges are not the same standards as those applied to due process or equal protection claims. "Reasonableness" as used in the former
situation does not necessarily carry the same distinction from "substantial"
as it does when used in the latter situations.
McElwain, 248 Mont. at 235, 811 P.2d at 1269-70 (citations omitted).
114. 512 U.S. 374 (1994). The Court decided Dolan just after Dringman's comment was published, and therefore her analysis could not benefit from the Court's
elaboration of "substantial" in this case.
115.
See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379.
116.
See id. at 378-81.
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posed development."" 7 The answer, it held, is that there must
be a "rough proportionality" between the two, and the burden of
showing the "rough proportionality" falls on the government. 8
The Court concluded that the city had not met that burden, because the plaintiff was asked to surrender her valuable right to
exclude in exchange for an uncertain reduction in traffic
congestion." 9
It is crucial, we think, to recognize the unique nature of the
exaction cases. The Dolan Court was careful to draw a distinction between "generally applicable zoning regulations" and "an
adjudicative decision to condition [an] application for a building
permit on an individual parcel. " 2°
" It found that the former
calls for some deference to the judgment of the legislative
branch, while the latter-adjudicative, site-specific permit decisions-does not.'2 '
G. A Summary of Takings Doctrine
So, we might, at last, say to our novice land purchaser, takings history reveals takings doctrines to be highly complex and
indeterminate. We can best illustrate this by summarizing the
present content of the Supreme Court's takings doctrine.
Takings analysis requires a two-tier inquiry. The first tier
asks whether the government action substantially advances a
legitimate governmental interest."2 If the government action
takes the form of a condition imposed in exchange for a land use
permit, "substantially advances" means that the condition must
be roughly proportional to the impact of the proposed use."2 If
the case involves a generally-applicable regulation, the first-tier
test is rather easily met, although perhaps not so easily met as
the familiar "rational basis test."' 24
Assuming the governmental action passes the first tier, the
second tier of the analysis asks whether the effect of the govern-

117. Id. at 386. But see id. at 411-13 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
facts did not present this question).
118. Id. at 391.
119. See id. at 393.
120. Id. at 391 n.8.
121. See id. This caveat appears designed to avoid exactly the sort of confusion
Dringman engenders by seeking to apply Nollan's language to require heightened
scrutiny of general police power regulations.
122. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987).
123. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
124. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834-35.
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ment action is so severe that compensation is required."= In
addressing this question, both the economic impact of the action
and the character of the action must be considered." The economic impact inquiry has two parts: (1) the degree to which the
action interferes with economic use of the affected parcel; and (2)
the degree to which this interference affects reasonable investment-backed expectations.127 If the action deprives the parcel in
question of all economically beneficial use, and this deprivation
could not have been reasonably expected from so-called "background principles" of state property law, the action is a per se
taking."2 If some economic use of the parcel remains, the action may or may not be a taking."2 Turning to the character of
the action, if the action can be characterized as a permanent
physical invasion, then it is a per se taking.1 30 If the regulation
infringes on residential privacy interests, as opposed to commercial interests, it is more likely to be a taking.' If it can be
characterized as an appropriation of the property for the
government's own use, it is more likely to be a taking.'3 2 If the
benefit from the deprivation is spread widely among the public
at large, the action is less likely to be a taking."3
It should now be clear, if nothing else is, that takings doctrine is both complex and indeterminate. Four additional ques125.
See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
126. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124
127. See id.
128.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029-31 (1992).
This categorical rule may also apply to economic deprivations which are severe, but
less than total. Id.; see also First Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S.
304 (1987) (temporary regulatory takings of all use found not different in kind from
permanent takings of all use).
129.
See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978);
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470, 493-502 (1987). Even
if the deprivation is nearly total, the action is not a taking if one could reasonably
anticipate the possibility of such a deprivation from the relevant law. See Lucas, 505
U.S. at 1027-28 (citing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66-67 (1979) (ban on sale of
bird parts not a taking, due to the state's "traditionally high degree of control over
personal property")).
130.
See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426-35
(1982).
131.
See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 262 (1946). See generally Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (discussed infra at text accompanying notes 190-97).
132. See Causby, 328 U.S. at 262; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 392-96 (demand for dedication of land as public park was a taking, while demand to set land aside as private
park, which would provide the same flood control benefits, would perhaps not be a
taking). See generally Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104.
133.
See, e.g., Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485-92; Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590, 594-96 (1962).
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tions might now occur to our novice: First, does the history of
takings doctrines and takings law just described mean that the
conception of property in the United States Constitution is different in some way from that provided in the systems of positive
law in the respective states? Second, how do we know exactly
what the positive law requires in various jurisdictions? Third,
what are the purposes of these apparently complex systems of
private property ownership? Fourth, how do these purposes
shape both the positive law of individual jurisdictions and the
constitutional prohibition on uncompensated takings? Parts III,
IV, and V attempt to answer, respectively, the first two and then
the third and fourth of these questions.
PART III. PROPERTY IN POSITIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
When does a constitutionally prohibited uncompensated
taking occur? First, "no constitutionally significant taking of
property can occur unless some government in some way perpetuates a departure from some then-existent body of law, upon
which the complaining party might appropriately have relied as
securing to him or her some property-based advantage.""3 The
phrase "then-existent body of law" refers to the common law,
statutory law, and regulations which qualify and affirm the baseline incidents of property ownership in the several states.'35
Before we can determine, using the two-tier analysis, whether a
governmental action has "taken" an advantage secured by this
body of state positive law, we must know exactly what advantages that body of law secures. But the federal nature of our political structure complicates this analysis. Who, our novice might
ask, decides what advantages are secured by state law? Does the
United States Supreme Court decide what state property law
advantages are in place at the time of the government action
alleged to be a taking, or is that decision a matter for state
courts? 3 6
We might respond that property interests are defined by

134. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence:A Comment
on Lucas and Judicial Conservatism, 35 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 301, 309 (1993) (emphasis in original).
135. Id. at 310.
136. These questions provide the focus of Professor Michelman's article. See id.
Indeed, Michelman is particularly interested in the dilemma this issue creates for
conservatives like Justice Scalia. To protect property interests, the Court must retain
the authority to decide state property law issues; however, to protect federalism, the
Court must leave the authority to decide state property law with state courts.
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state law and are, thus, a matter for state courts. State courts
are the authoritative voice on the issue of what interests are
secured for property owners at any particular time. We could go
on to explain the source of this authority in the federalism provided in our constitutional scheme and, to give a truly complete
answer, the theory of the allocation of powers that our federalism is meant to accomplish." 7 But, to be fair to our novice, we
would want to point out that this answer raises much deeper
and more controversial jurisprudential questions. For example,
exactly how are state courts to decide what interests are secured
by state property law at a particular moment? Moreover, must
the United States Supreme Court accept just any state court
construction of state property law, or does the federal Takings
Clause place some sort of limits on acceptable interpretations?"
Perhaps an example would help. Suppose someone is considering the purchase of a large tract of land in the Flathead Valley. This purchaser came from out of state, and, as a prudent
land purchaser, consults an attorney to ask what restrictions
apply to the use and development of land in the Flathead Valley.
The attorney might give four answers, assuming that the purchaser already understood the standard incidents of property
ownership. First, state nuisance law and land use regulations
prohibit uses which harm others. Second, land use regulations
protect the public interest in orderly development. These include
various types of zoning and planning regulations and related
permit procedures. Here it would be possible for the attorney to
explain just what regulations now apply to the specific piece of
property being considered for purchase. Third, a sophisticated
attorney would also want to caution our hypothetical Flathead
Valley land purchaser that some restrictions may also follow
from the background principles of Montana's general property
law.'39 Fourth, the attorney would warn of impending changes
in the statutory or regulatory schemes revealed in contemporary
and predictable political activity. For example, a recent spate of
development in what had been a relatively unpopulated area
might well signal an impending increase in land-use regulation,
as might increasing public awareness of the environmental ef137. See id. at 302-03.
138.
See id. at 314. This is the focus of a disagreement between Justices Scalia
and Blackmun in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992),
discussed infra in note 143.
139. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031-32.
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fects of development."4
In sum, the property interest which a prospective purchaser
receives in exchange for her money includes restrictions on uses
prescribed by the existing rules, restrictions which might follow
from the background principles and understandings of the relevant state law, and impending changes in restrictions. Those
"rules, principles, and understandings" will always be subject to
the vicissitudes of the Montana Supreme Court's interpretations
of their meaning, their practical application, and their consistency with state and federal constitutional principles. Our attorney
will add that it is difficult to predict, at the margins, exactly
what the Montana Supreme Court might do with any particular
case. However, reasonably accurate predictions are possible in
many cases.
To return then to the question with which we began this
section: "When does a constitutionally prohibited, uncompensated taking occur?" Our lawyer can now respond by saying that
uncompensated takings typically do not occur when government
restrictions on property present in the state law's "existing rules
and background principles and understandings" are in force.
Such existing rules, principles, and understandings already qualify property ownership, already inhere in the meaning of property in the particular jurisdiction, and already affect the market
value of property. Thus, common law interpretations of property,
or statutory schemes which merely implement the existing rules,
principles, and understandings, would not be compensable takings. This means that:
questions about the content and meaning of historical state
property law are potentially in issue every time someone complains in court that a state government has violated the Federal Constitution by taking property without paying for it. If a
taking of property can occur only when a government in some
way perpetuates a departure from the then-existing body of
property law, then in order to tell whether a given state action
takes property you have to know what the State's property law
as a matter of fact is-what that law as a matter of fact
says-at the moment when the action complained of takes

It is our guess that most land purchasers in Montana do not have lawyers
140.
and, therefore, do not have good information regarding future land-use regulation,
nor would they be likely to be able to cheaply obtain the kind of information described in this paragraph. Though beyond the scope of this paper, it would be interesting to study the extent to which uncertainties regarding present and future regulation are discounted in the price of property.
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place.'
But, herein lies the special complexity of our federalist decisionmaking structure. The United States Supreme Court, under the
Takings Clause, may review state supreme court decisions upholding state regulations of property. The question that inevitably arises for the Court in its review, is the extent to which the
Court can or should question the state supreme court's construction of its own state's property law. In Lucas, the Court looked to
the South Carolina Supreme Court to determine what limitations already "inhere in ... the restrictions that background
principles of the State's law of property and nuisance ... place
upon land ownership,"'4 2 and the Court said it would examine
the state court's decision to determine if it was an "objectively
reasonable" application of the state's law." This means the
state court's construction of that state's property law is never
final, because it is always subject to review by the Supreme
Court as an "objectively reasonable" construction of the rules and
background principles and understandings of its law.
But, to complicate this matter further, the Supreme Court
has not deferred to "objectively reasonable" state court constructions of state practices in cases involving adjudicative decisions
conditioning building permits on the exaction of property interests.'" The Court, rather, applies its own "rough proportionality" standard to such cases, thus narrowing its deference to state
courts, and its respect for
federalism, to cases involving generally
145
applicable regulations.

141.
Michelman, supra note 134, at 310.
142. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
143.
Michelman, supra note 134, at 314 (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1032 n.18).
Justices Scalia and Blackmun focus on the difficulties raised by this issue in Lucas,
505 U.S. at 1032 n.18, and 1054-55, respectively. As the Court remanded the State's
zoning regulation (which had eliminated, arguably, all the plaintiff's economically
valuable use) to state court for determination of whether it was implicit state common law nuisance principles, Justice Blackmun, in dissent, worried that "t]here is
simply no reason to believe that new interpretations of the hoary common-law nuisance doctrine will be particularly 'objective' or 'value free'." Id. at 1055. In response,
Justice Scalia argued: "There is no doubt some leeway in a court's interpretation of
what existing state law permits-but not remotely as much, we think, as in a legislative crafting of the reasons for its confiscatory regulation. We stress that an affirmative decree eliminating all economically beneficial uses may be defended only if an
objectively reasonable application of relevant precedents would exclude those beneficial
uses in the circumstances in which the land is presently found." Id. at 1032 n.18
(emphasis added).
144.
See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
145.
See supra text accompanying notes 114-21.
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Finally, if new statutes or regulations stray too far beyond
the background principles and understandings, a taking may
also have occurred. Again, state courts would interpret the new
rules and decide the reach of the background principles and
understandings,"4 and state courts and ultimately the United
States Supreme Court would decide whether a new regulation,
which goes beyond the existing background principles and understandings, has gone too far and is, therefore, a compensable
taking.
Consider, again, the example of our hypothetical Flathead
Valley land purchaser. Suppose part of the land our purchaser is
planning to purchase is on the Flathead River near Bigfork.147
Suppose, also, that nothing in current rules or regulations specifically prohibits building a single family dwelling near the river
on this piece of land. However, as our wise lawyer has warned
our hypothetical land purchaser, all land development in Montana is understood to be subject to the reasonable exercise of the
state's police power. In particular, the Montana Supreme Court
has stated that changes in the rules governing land use are
acceptable if they are "substantially related to the legitimate
State interest in protecting the health, safety, morals, or general
welfare of the public.""4 In other words, the regulation must
fall within, and be substantially related to, the purposes of the
state's police powers, and, the Montana Supreme Court has added that the rules must use "the least restrictive means necessary
to achieve [these police power ends] without denying the owner
economically viable use of his or her land."'49 In effect, our prospective land purchaser must understand that future development on the land she might purchase may be limited as the
state determines necessary to protect the public interest, provided the "substantially related" and "least restrictive means" standards are met, and provided that all economically viable use is
not denied.
Thus new regulations following from background principles

146. The state courts would also want to consider any special provisions of the
state constitution that might provide adequate and independent state grounds for the
protection of private property from adverse governmental actions. See discussion of
"or damaging" language in the Montana Constitution, supra text accompanying notes
39-50.
147. This example is based roughly on McElwain v. County of Flathead, 248
Mont. 231, 811 P.2d 1267 (1991).
148. Id. at 235; 811 P.2d at 1270. The U.S. Supreme Court has applied a similar standard under its first-tier analysis. See supra text accompanying notes 52-69.
149.
McElwain, 248 Mont. at 235; 811 P.2d at 1270.
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and understandings qualify property ownership in Montana as
surely as do existing, specific land-development rules and regulations. Changes in what the background principles and understandings will allow, in new circumstances, will inevitably reflect
changing social and environmental conditions. In the context of
urban zoning, the United States Supreme Court expressly acknowledged the effect of changing conditions on the applications
of the background principles to property as long ago as 1926:
Building zone laws are of modem origin. They began in this
country about 25 years ago. Until recent years, urban life was
comparatively simple; but, with the great increase and concentration of population, problems have developed, and constantly
are developing, which require, and will continue to require,
additional restrictions in respect of the use and occupation of
private lands in urban communities. Regulations, the wisdom
and necessity and validity of which, as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained,
a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have
been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive .... And in this there
is no inconsistency, for, while the meaning of constitutional
guaranties never varies, the scope of their application must
expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions
which are constantly coming within the field of their operation.
In a changing world, it is impossible that it should be otherwise.1"
But how, exactly, do we predict just what those background
principles and understandings will allow in the future, given
changing circumstances? Of course, a shrewd lawyer will consider just what those background principles and understandings
have permitted in the past, and how the Montana Supreme
Court and the United States Supreme Court have construed such
principles. Obviously, differences in the background principles
and understandings in different states will, in turn, be reflected
in different common law rules and different statutory and regulatory schemes in those states.
We believe that predicting when the courts will find a new
regulation goes too far beyond the background principles and
understandings of state property law, requires an understanding
of the political and moral values these principles and understandings serve. The more that we know about why our society
thinks it is important to protect certain property interests, the

150.

Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-87 (1926).
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better we will be able to predict the concrete form that such
protection will take in specific cases. This is where the underlying conflict in values becomes most apparent.
PART

IV. THE PHILOSOPHICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN AMERICAN LAW

Suppose, to extend our metaphor, that our Flathead Valley
attorney studied the moral basis of property rights before deciding to attend law school. She might then explain to our prospective land purchaser that in our constitutional and common law
traditions, private property is said to rest, at least in part, on all
of three "general" justifications:. 5' The general welfare or utility justification, the labor or economic justice justification, and
the self-expression or personal liberty justification.'52 These
three general justifications, unfortunately, lead to an intractable
and profound "coordination" problem-what are we to do when
the justifications produce conflicting results in particular cases?"

151. Becker contrasts general, specific, and particular justifications as follows:
"([G]eneral justification: Why should there be any property rights at all - ever? ...
[S]pecific justification: Given that there should be property rights of some kind, what
kind(s) should there be? ... [Plarticular justification: Given that a specific kind of
property is justifiable, who, in particular, should have title to existing pieces of it?"
Lawrence Becker, The Moral Basis of Property Rights, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY
187, 187 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) [hereinafter Becker,
Moral Basis]. Becker also notes the distinction between "natural" rights to property,
.said to 'occur naturally,' and "positivistic" rights to property "which arise from human institutions." BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 16. The "natural
rights to property" tradition, prevalent at the time of the framing of the Constitution
and particularly influential during the Gilded Age and the Lochner era, was replaced
during the New Deal era and by the Warren Court with a more positivistic conception of property. See Michelman, supra note 131, at 307. Both of these conceptions of
property, which speak to the ultimate sources of law, are themselves developed and
applied in terms of the three general justifications discussed in this section. For
example, John Locke's famous conception of the natural right to property analyzes
property primarily in terms of the "labor" general justification. See John Locke, THE
SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT

27 (Thomas P. Peardon ed. 1952).

152. See BECKER, MORAL BASIS, at 193-94. Becker describes four conceptually
sound, independent lines of justification from the philosophical literature. We believe
that truncated versions of three of those lines of justification appear in takings law.
153. Becker notes, and we agree, that because these general justifications are
essentially independent and of presumptively equal weight no strategy yields a priority solution, leaving us with an intractable coordination problem. See id. at 194-95.
There are also at least three other general justifications not typically present in
takings law, viz., first occupancy, conquest, and the Lockean version of the labor
justification. First occupancy and conquest arguments often turn up in early land
claims cases. See, e.g., Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). For a
discussion of first occupancy and Lockean labor arguments see BECKER, PROPERTY
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Our prospective land purchaser, a bit overwhelmed by these
arguments, asks for a detailed explanation of the three general
justifications. Our lawyer suggests that these explanations might
make more sense if she, first, discussed some examples of these
lines of justification and the "coordination" problem. M
Suppose lobbyists for several environmental groups ask your
state legislature to protect the lakes and rivers in your state
from increasing development.15 5 The state legislature responds
by enacting a comprehensive shoreline zoning statute. This statute, which requires that individual counties in your state enact
county-wide shoreline zoning, prohibits, inter alia, filling
wetlands within 1000 feet of lakes without a county permit. The
state statute is founded on scientific evidence that changing
wetlands adjacent to lakes upsets the natural environment of
those lakes by altering their aquatic life and thus their ecosystems. After your state legislature enacts this policy scheme, your
county zoning officer denies a permit to landowners who planned
to build a long-awaited retirement home along a favorite lake.
The landowners may still build a home on their property, but the
home must be 1000 feet from the lake. The landowners sue,
claiming a taking of private property without just compensation.
The lower courts deny their claim."M The case goes to the United States Supreme Court.
The state argues to the Court that it is perfectly within the
authority of the state, under its police powers, to maximize the
general welfare of its citizens, to promote economic efficiency,
thus to maximize social utility. Moreover, the state argues, this
pursuit of the general welfare in the state's regulation of private
property is one of the background principles and understandings
of this, and every, state's property law. In short, the state makes
the argument that private property rights are both justified by
their social utility and limited by their social disutility. The right
to build adjacent to the lakes, by filling wetlands, is worth a
fraction of the value of the lakes to the state's citizens. No one
owns property without recognizing that the state's police power,

RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 24-31, 32-52.
154. For the detailed discussion of the three general justifications, see infra text
accompanying notes 148-61.
155.
This example is based roughly on Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761
(Wis. 1972).
156. Typically the state supreme court finds no taking under the federal constitution. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992);
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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when exercised to prevent social costs, may limit the property's
use.
The landowners make two counterarguments to the Court.
First, they argue that their land has economic value which is a
part of their justly earned wealth. The purchase price of their
property, with lake access and lake views, reflected the
landowners' expectations for development that they believed, and
the sellers believed, were available prior to the enactment of this
ordinance. The landowners expended their justly earned savings
on the purchase of the property. Protection of this wealth is also
one of the background principles and understandings of this
state's private property system. This statute, limiting the development on this property, is, effectively, an unexpected and therefore unfair theft of the landowner's wealth.
The landowners argue, second, that the state is ignoring the
important and irreplaceable opportunities for self-expression of
the landowners also found in the background principles and
understandings which are secured by private property. The landowners in this particular case have planned for years to build
their retirement home on the lake; and they are now denied this
important opportunity to spend the closing years of their lives
enjoying the amenities of their lakeshore property. Thus if the
Court denies the landowners the opportunity to build along the
lake, the landowners lose their liberty of self-expression in their
property, and the autonomy to fulfill the plans they have made
for their lives.
The United States Supreme Court now faces a problem.
Which of these three values: (1) the social utility values expressed in the statute protecting the ecology of the lakes raised
by the state, or (2) the economic justice values or (3) the liberty
of self-expression values raised by the landowners, when balanced against each other, best expresses the balance of values
implicit in the background principles and understandings of the
property law of the state which passed this statute? 157 Put another way, should the lakefront landowners have recognized that
their development rights were always vulnerable to the social
utility balancing which the legislature did when it enacted this
statute? If so, the statute is not a taking of property without just
compensation.

157. This assumes that the Court does not bring a balance of values independent
of the state's balance of those values. The controversies surrounding this assumption
are discussed infra text accompanying notes 205-09.
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This presents the ultimate problem in takings law: To understand what you own, you must know: (1) the traditional incidents of property ownership-possession, use, and disposition,
plus (2) the traditional common law limitations on property ownership-e.g., eminent domain and judgment execution powers of
government, and common law nuisance principles, plus (3) the
various existing rules and regulations governing property promulgated by the legislature and the executive branch, plus (4)
the background principles and understandings governing the
state's future exercise of its police powers, plus (5) the balance of
the three competing, underlying values as they are expressed in
the law of the state in which this land purchase is to occur, and
(6) the United States Supreme Court's evaluation of the balance
of those sets of values as comporting with, or as exceeding, the
background principles and understandings."
"But," our purchaser might ask, "how can you possibly reconcile three independent values which serve as the foundation for
private property, when there is no clear principle coordinating
those values? I would think that you would have to engage in
some sort of 'highly non-formal, open ended, multi-factor balancing effort." 159
But, our lawyer might respond, this is not quite as difficult
as it might seem. The outcomes of takings cases will reflect, at
bottom, the balancing of the three general justifications for property mentioned above. To understand the "taking" issue, then,
we need to understand the character and independence of these
three lines of justification.
The first, and most common justification for property (and
therefore, of government regulation of property) is the general
welfare justification. Philosophers typically describe these kinds
of justifications as "utilitarian."
Human happiness is an important human good. Achieving
human happiness requires that persons be able to "acquire, possess, use, and consume things."1" Security in the acquisition,
possession, and use of property which is necessary to provide the
happiness which property can bring, requires a system of property rights.161 Because the achievement of human happiness is
the only value here, all limitations on the acquisition, possession,

158.
159.
160.
161.

See supra text accompanying notes 114-21.
See Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLuM. L. REv. 1600, 1621 (1988).
BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 58.
See id.
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use, and consumption of property in the utilitarian property
rights system must be justified by their contribution to the net
sum of human happiness. The system of property which results
from this utility balancing will be said to maximize utility. Typically these arguments appeal to the state's authority under the
police power to pursue the health, safety, and general welfare of
the public. These arguments often include a substantial "market
capitalism" component, viz., capitalism promotes the creation of
wealth which promotes human happiness, and capitalism requires a system of private property rights.
One interesting species of this kind of justification, which
integrates police power regulations with market considerations,
seeks regulations which promote economic efficiency.1 2 This
form of the argument asserts that "property rights should be
defined so as to best approximate, in operation, the idealized free
market model of efficiency in allocation.""e Limits on rights
found in "liability rules, restrictions in use, transferability, transmissibility, possession, income, or the rest of the elements of full
ownership [i.e., the liberal incidents of ownership] must be evaluated for [their] ability to move things toward [efficiency]." " '
The advantage of the economic version of police power regulation
is said to be its ability to better measure utility (in economic
terms with price, for example), but the general welfare justification and the economic justification are fundamentally the
same. They see property ownership in instrumental terms, and
they seek, in the system of property ownership, maximum human happiness.
The second most common general justification for property is
the labor or economic justice justification. The basic idea here is
familiar, widely accepted, and commonly asserted."6 Producers
deserve the fruits of their labors.'
The system of property
rights is justified because it guarantees to the producer the appropriate protections for the production accomplished by his or
her efforts. The best version of this argument' makes a relatively modest claim, namely that "[i]t is not so much that the

162. See generally, Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1960); see also Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
163. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 71.
164. Id. at 71.
165. See id. at 41.
166. See id.
167.
This argument is traditionally associated with John Locke and John Stuart
Mill.
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producers deserve the produce of their labors. It is rather that no
one else does, and it is not wrong for the laborer to have
them."" The rhetoric of this argument finds its roots in the
"work ethic"-in the idea that the virtue of industry deserves
reward. In law, the argument is typically taken to be a fundamental principle of fairness.169 Accordingly, it is simply not fair,
not economically just, to take the economic worth of the product
of labor without sufficient justification. 7
The third general line of justification characteristically at
work in the law of takings is the self-expression or personal liberty justification. This justification focuses on the material elements of our "other" liberties, what John Rawls calls the economic worth of liberties. 7' This justification can best be seen historically. The great advance which the system of private property
brought in the seventeenth century was to allow persons the
material means to carry out their lives. When the lord of the
manor owned everything, the serfs' lives were entirely at the
mercy of the lord.'72 The emerging system of private ownership
thus provided the material means for persons to exercise their
liberties.'73
Two versions of this justification seem present, though undifferentiated, in American law. The first connects property ownership to other important liberties like those protected by the
rights to speech, privacy, and association. 74 Typically the law
allows the property owner to use the property in ways that support other liberties. The other version focuses on the intrinsic
importance of property to self-expression. This version of the
personal liberty argument 75 focuses on the importance of mate168.
BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 41.
169. See id. at 48. Complex qualifications in the philosophical literature on this
justification make it seem weak. For example, Becker suggests that the labor that
produces the property claim must be beyond what is required morally of others, and
produces something that would not have existed except for the labor. Moreover, the
product must be something from which it is not wrong to exclude others. See id. at
41-56. Nonetheless, takings law treats this justification as if it were fundamental and
unqualified.
170. This argument carries the greatest weight in takings law the more personal
and less commercial the property in question. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
171. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 204-05 (1971).
172. See Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 770-72 (1964).
173. See id.
174. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1976), discussed infra in
text accompanying notes 190-97. But see Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1
(1973).
175. This argument is traditionally associated with G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of
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rial things to the development of human personality. To develop
their personality, persons need things in which to express that
personality. The idea of the private home, for example, reflecting
one's personality in its design and its decoration, captures well
this version of the self-expression argument.
To understand the operation and concrete force of these
three general justifications in takings law, and to realize the
difficulty we have harmonizing their respective claims, we rely
upon on several old and recent Supreme Court takings cases to
conclude our analysis.
PART V. THE SUPREME CouRT's DECISIONS IN PHILOSOPHICAL

CONTEXT
In the preceding two sections, we have attempted to explain
why the takings inquiry is so complicated. We have seen that the
heart of the inquiry involves a sort of "judgment call" about
whether a government action goes beyond what a property owner
could have expected from an informed reading of state property
law. We have seen that the resolution of this question is complicated by the existence of the federal structure of our political
system, and by the fact that we lack a single coherent philosophical rationale underlying the institution of private property, but
instead have three distinct and often conflicting rationales. In
this section, we hope to illustrate, in the context of some of the
cases discussed in Part II, how these various factors interact to
produce the complex and uncertain doctrines we observe in modern takings law.
The general welfare justification, as we discussed in the
preceding section, is closely associated with the police power of
the state. Decisions upholding police power regulations against
takings challenges can generally be explained as findings that
the state's interest in maximizing utility outweighs the self-expression/liberty and labor/economic justice concerns of the landowner. Miller v. Schoene,17 the Virginia cedar rust case, offers
a good example. The plaintiffs in Miller would appear to have a
powerful self-expression argument. The red cedar trees most
likely were of great personal importance to the plaintiffs. They
no doubt took great pride in ownership of the red cedars and

Right and Law §41

(J.M. Sterritt Trans.), in THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEGEL 241 (Carl

J. Friedrich ed., Random House 1954).
176. 276 U.S. 272 (1928). For a discussion of Miller, see supra notes 64-69 and
accompanying text.
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derived pleasure from having just that sort of tree surrounding
their homes. By cutting down the trees, the state had, in a sense,
invaded their private homes.177 Likewise, the landowners could
frame their argument in labor/economic justice terms loss of the
cedars reduced the market value of their homes, value which
rightfully belonged to the plaintiffs. The Court rejected these
arguments. In its view, the simple question was whether apple
trees or cedar trees were more important to society: "The state
does not exceed its constitutional powers by deciding on the
destruction of one class of property in order to save another
which, in the judgment of the legislature, is of greater value to
the public."'78
Note the role the three competing justifications play in the
case. The central question is whether a statute authorizing the
destruction of privately-owned cedar trees to prevent agricultural
damage is reasonably consistent with background principles of
Virginia property law, or whether it is instead an impermissibly
abrupt departure from those principles. Because each of the
three justifications is itself a part of that body of background
principles, the task for the state courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, is to decide how much weight to ascribe to each of
the justifications in the context of this case. The Court favored
the utility justification implicit in the police power: "Where the
public interest is involved, preferment of that interest over the
property interest of the individual, to the extent even of its destruction, is one of the distinguishing characteristics
of every
" 1 79
exercise of the police power which affects property.

The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia had reached the
same conclusion." In affirming this decision, the United
States Supreme Court could have been doing either or both of
two things. It could have been saying (as we have just suggested)
that, as a matter of Virginia property law, the Virginia court's
balance of the three values was sufficiently consistent with
Virginia's precedent that it did not violate the federal Takings
Clause by shifting the state's property rules unexpectedly. Alternately, the Court could have been saying that the state court
decision did not violate some independent balance of values man-

177. Indeed, if a similar case were to arise today, the plaintiff would appear to
have a strong argument under the "physical invasion" analysis of Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426-35 (1982).
178. Miller, 276 U.S. at 279.
179. Id. at 279-80.
180. See id. at 277.
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dated by the federal Takings Clause, i.e., it did not violate some
minimum federal version of the background rights to self-expression and to the fruits of one's labors. Unfortunately, the uncertain basis of the Court's decision in Miller would appear in many
of the Court's takings cases.
In Mahon, 8' the Court's definitive regulatory takings case,
the Court had also chosen not to discuss the interplay between
state and federal law. Mahon most clearly illustrates the
strength of the labor/economic justice justification in takings law.
In the Court's view, the state was trying to steal back, through
regulation, the very same coal that its citizens had willingly sold
to the coal company years before. 82 The Court portrayed the
state (and the state's individual citizens) as foolish sellers trying
to escape a bad bargain:
The rights of the public in a street purchased or laid out by
eminent domain are those it has paid for. If in any case its
representatives have been so short sighted as to acquire only
surface rights without the right of support we see no more
authority for supplying the latter without compensation than
there was for taking the right of way in the first place and
refusing to pay for it because the public wanted it very
much. 1

The state might have a valid reason to want the coal, but in
economic justice terms, it did not deserve the coal. The Pennsylvania Coal Company, which had shrewdly obtained waivers of
the right to claim subsidence damages years before, did deserve
it.

In contrast to Miller, the Court in Mahon overturned the
decision of the state court.' The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
apparently believed the coal company's expectation that it would
receive the benefit of these reserved mineral rights was not so
firmly rooted in the relevant background principles that it outweighed the state's authority to maximize utility. This belief by
the Pennsylvania court would have been entirely understandable
given the nearly unqualified authority of the states to regulate
under the police power prior to Mahon. The Court disagreed,
finding, in its famous phrase, that the state's regulations had

181.
182.

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
See id. at 415.

183.

Id.

184.

See id. at 416.
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"gone too far."8 ' Again, it was not clear, however, whether the
Kohler Act went too far beyond the background principles of
Pennsylvania law, or if it violated substantive notions of labor
and economic justice included in the federal takings clause, or if,
to some degree, it did both. Because the Court sharply changed
its own doctrine-its deference to state police power regulations-and because the states saw police power regulations as
unqualified by federal takings doctrines, this lack of clarity is
easy to appreciate.
The Court did not explicitly discuss such issues for many
years. However, its general silence in the takings area from the
late 1920s through the late 1970s, and particularly its silence in
takings cases arising under state law, suggests that the Court
was comfortable with the notion that property was primarily a
matter of state positive law. This explanation gains support from
the wealth of case law that emerged from state courts in the
same period." The Court's silence also corresponds with its
general withdrawal from the field of economic regulation after
the era of substantive due process, reflecting its new-found (in
the 1930s) policy
of deference on economic matters to the legisla87
tive branches.

Two cases from this period, however, suggest that the Court
still found the self-expression justifications for property to be
important. The first was United States v. Causby, in which
the Court found that the federal government had taken the value
of the plaintiffs home with airplane overflights.8 9 The second
case, Moore v. City of East Cleveland,19" was technically not a
taking case at all. Moore involved a zoning ordinance which
allowed only members of a nuclear family to live in the same
dwelling.' 9 ' The Court overturned the conviction of a grandmother who was living with her son and two grandsons who
were cousins. The majority found the ordinance to be an infringement of the rights of association and privacy articulated in

185.
See id. at 415.
186. See, e.g., Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 394
P.2d 182 (1964); Candlestick Properties Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation and
Dev. Comm'n, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970); Lyon Sand and Gravel Co. v. Township of
Oakland, 190 N.W.2d 354 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971); Morris County Land Improvement
Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 193 A.2d 232 (N.J. 1963).
187.
See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
188.
328 U.S. 256 (1946).
189.
Causby, 328 U.S. at 266-67.
190.
431 U.S. 494 (1977).
191.
See Moore, 431 U.S. at 496.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol59/iss1/3

38

Clifford and Huff: An Essay on Takings

19981

AN ESSAY ON "TAINGS"

cases such as Pierce v. Society of Sisters,'

Griswold v.

3 and Roe v. Wade.'" In his concurring
Connecticut,"'
opinion,
however, Justice Stevens saw the case as a simple land use regulation that should be analyzed under the "substantial relation"
test of Euclid and Nectow." 5 Citing a number of state zoning
cases that struck down similar ordinances, he concluded that the
nuclear-family ordinance bore no substantial relation to its stated goals of reducing crowding and traffic congestion and, thus,
represented a taking of property without due process or just
compensation. Stevens elaborated:

since [this ordinance] cuts so deeply into a fundamental right
normally associated with the ownership of residential property-that of an owner to decide who may reside on his or her
property-it must fall under the limited standard of review of
zoning decisions which this Court preserved in Euclid and
Nectow."
Taken together the majority and concurring opinions in Moore
illustrate a certain degree of overlap between the self-expression
justification included in the property clauses, and the privacy
interests associated with the concept of "liberty" in the Due Process Clause. When police power regulation infringes on this sort
of interest, Moore suggests that the Court will pay less deference
to a state court's balancing of the background values in state
property law. This partly reflects that, while an extensive body
of case law interpreting "property" exists at the state level, the
doctrines
interpreting "liberty" have been predominately feder97
al.1
The Court's more modern takings cases reflect the same
tensions among the three lines of justification, and between state
and federal law. The multi-factor analysis of Penn Central9-another case pitting the economic justice interests of a
private business against the utilitarian interests of the

192.

268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down state law requiring children to attend

public schools).
193.
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down state law banning the use of contraceptives by married persons).
194. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking down state law banning abortions).
195.
See Moore, 431 U.S. at 513-15 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) and Nectow v. City of Cambridge,
277 U.S. 183 (1928)).
196.
Moore, 431 U.S. at 520-21 (Stevens, J., concurring).
197.
See Michelman, supra note 134, at 303-04.
198.
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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state-balances these concerns against each other. In subsequent
cases, the actual outcome of the balance has depended largely on
the facts in each case. For example, in Kaiser Aetna, the Court
found that the federal government took property by requiring a
privately-built marina to be open to public navigation.' The
Court emphasized that the plaintiffs had lost the right to exclude
others from their property, one of the most basic of the standard
20°
incidents. 2" In sharp contrast, within a year, in Pruneyard,
the Court attached much less importance to the right to exclude
in the context of commercial property, agreeing with the California Supreme Court that:
It bears repeated emphasis that we do not have under consideration the property or privacy rights of an individual homeowner or the proprietor of a modest retail establishment. As a
result of advertising... 25,000 persons are induced to congregate daily to take advantage of the numerous amenities offered
by the [shopping center].'
Kaiser Aetna appears to reflect the self-expression justification. The loss of the right to exclude others was important to
"maintain the privacy and security of the pond."2"3 Pruneyard
appears to reject the labor/economic justice line of justification.
The Court found that the loss of the right to exclude had little, if
any, effect on the investment value or profitability of the shopping center. "°
In Lucas, 5 the Court finally discussed explicitly the role
of federalism in takings jurisprudence. The decision itself was a
direct descendant of Mahon, holding that the state had "stolen"
the economic value of the plaintiffs lots through a regulation
that rendered them worthless. Such a regulation, by nature,
went too far-it violated "the historical compact recorded in the

199. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979).
200. See id. at 179-80.
201. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 78 (1980).
202. Id. at 78 (quoting Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center, 592 P.2d 341 (Cal.
1979).
203. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 168.
204. See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 83. More recently, Dolan seemed to violate the
distinction that had been drawn in Kaiser Aetna and PruneYard, by holding that the
right to exclude was a crucial element of the plaintiffs property interest in her
hardware store. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 393 (1994). Dolan may
reflect the Court's increasing desire to fashion blanket rules that ignore the distinc-

tions between factual contexts.
205. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 (1992).
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Takings Clause."2" But the Court offered the state a way out:
the regulation would not be a taking if authority for it could be
found in an "objectively reasonable" interpretation of South Carolina property law. 7 This indicates that the Beachfront Management Act went too far because it departed unexpectedly from
South Carolina precedent, not because it departed from substantive requirements of the Takings Clause.
Lucas, then, suggests a vision of the Takings Clause not as
an independent source of substantive property law, but instead
as a sort of "brake" on how quickly state courts may change the
interpretation of their own property law. Lucas certainly implies
that, when discovering takings, the focus of attention ought to be
on departures from the background principles and understandings of state property law, rather than on the meaning of "property" in the Takings Clause itself. By contrast, the Court's
"rough proportionality" test in Dolan's exaction context' implies that the Court is prepared to "discover" and impose on
municipalities Taking Clause standards which may be more rigorous than state background principles would have suggested.
These ambiguities in the Court's jurisprudence, and the Court's
apparent uncertainty about whether to respect state courts' constructions of state property law,' reveal, we think, the Court's
own ambivalence regarding its role under the Fifth Amendment's
Taking Clause.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the persistent problems of takings jurisprudence, as we have tried to describe, explain, and exemplify in
this essay, reflect our tradition's uncertainty regarding how to
balance the conflicting background principles which express the
purposes for private property rights. Moreover, the distinctive
role of the positive property law of the states in defining property rights, combined with the uncertain role of the federal Takings Clause and, thus, the Supreme Court in protecting those
rights will provide no practical forum for resolving these uncertainties. Takings law will, therefore, remain complex, uncertain,
governed by balancing tests, and highly fact-dependent. Property
owners will have to depend on the considered judgments of their

206.
207.
208.
209.

Id.
See
See
See

at 1028.
id. at 1032 n.18.
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
id.
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attorneys to understand their property rights, and their attorneys will be faced with difficult tasks as they attempt to offer
their clients any very certain advice about the law that protects
their property from government action.
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